In The Troubadour of Knowledge, Michel Serres demonstrates, by means of an extended discussion of learning, that our capacity to adopt a position presupposes a kind of disorienting exposure to a dimension of pure possibility that both subtends and destabilizes that position. In this paper I trace out the implications of this insight for our understanding of obligation, especially as it is articulated in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Specifically, I argue that obligation is given along with a dimension of moral possibility, and not, as Kant thought, as an unmediated fact of reason.
Throughout his entire body of work, Michel Serres has emphasized the priority of disorder to order, of disequilibrium to equilibrium, of noise to information, and of exposition to position. These ideas have their sources primarily in scientific accounts of the world, including everything from Lucretius' clinamen to contemporary developments in complexity theory and information theory. The value of these ideas, though, is not exclusively theoretical; what I would like to argue in this paper is that these ideas also have important implications for our understanding of moral experience. Specifically, I
will attempt to show how these ideas yield conceptions of moral sense and moral possibility that challenge radically the account of obligation advanced by Immanuel Kant. In what follows, I will begin with an interpretation of Serres's argument, developed most explicitly in The Troubadour of Knowledge, that our capacity to adopt any sort of position presupposes a disorienting exposure to a dimension of pure possibility that both subtends and destabilizes that position. I will then turn to an examination of Kant Although this account of learning seems plausible, it in fact leaves out the most essential part. The analogy as I have presented it suggests that the process of learning is divided neatly into two phases. During the brief time when the attacker is preparing to shoot, then, the goalkeeper must be poised to move in all seven of these directions. If she commits too early to one of the positions, she will almost certainly fail. She must remain exposed, outside of any given position, in order to have a reasonable chance at success. Eventually, of course, the goalkeeper will have to choose a direction. When she does this, we will tend to notice the open. This state of sensitivity is not an abstraction, but rather an experience that is given bodily in a wide variety of contexts. The musician, for example, who improvises along with other musicians can feel this openness right in his hands. He must be prepared to follow any number of leads that might be suggested by his fellow musicians. The musician experiences sensitivity especially vividly when he holds himself back, when he does not allow himself to resort to the chord changes or phrasings to which he is most accustomed and which he thus finds most comfortable. 11 We can see the same phenomenon in the example of learning. When I venture out far from the shore and cease to read or hear French from the position of an English speaker, I find myself especially sensitive to the nuances of the language I am struggling to learn. I hear the sound "ne"
and I hold back from mechanically translating it into English as "not": I need to listen very closely for a "pas" or a "que" or a "guère" that will make all the difference to the meaning of the sentence. That very brief moment between the "ne" and the "pas," "que,"
or "guère" is a moment of sensitivity that everyone who has learned French as a second language has felt very keenly.
Harlequin Emperor of the Moon
Serres provides a compelling image of the dimension of pure possibility that subtends position in his retelling of Nolant de Fatouville's seventeenth century farce
Arlequin empereur dans la lune. Harlequin, of course, is a stock character in the commedia dell'arte tradition, recognizable by his multi-colored patchwork costume. He is usually depicted as a comically unintelligent and unscrupulous servant in love with
Columbine, a maid whom he attempts incompetently to court. In Arlequin empereur dans la lune Columbine is depicted as a servant to Dr. Balouard, who is obsessed by the idea that there is a civilization on the moon that resembles the civilization here on Earth. In the opening scene Harlequin overhears Dr. Balouard telling Pierrot that three men-an apothecary, a baker, and a farmer-have asked him for Columbine's hand in marriage.
Recognizing that his opportunity to win Columbine's heart is slipping away, Harlequin adopts a succession of disguises, hoping to gain access to Dr. Balouard's home and thus to his beloved. In one scene Harlequin disguises himself as a woman, trying to convince the doctor's wife to take him in as her chambermaid. Later he attempts unsuccessfully to impersonate the apothecary, the baker, and the farmer who had requested Columbine's hand in marriage. And most comically, Harlequin presents himself to Dr. Balouard as an ambassador from the Emperor of the Moon, on whose behalf he requests permission to marry the doctor's daughter, Isabelle. In the final scene, Harlequin arrives in the guise of the Emperor of the Moon himself.
In Serres's retelling, Harlequin is presented at a press conference, where he is giving a report on his most recent inspection of his lunar territories. 12 The press are all excited to hear about how life on the moon differs from life on Earth. But Harlequin's presentation leaves everyone disappointed: everything on the moon, he insists, is just as it is here. The press cannot believe that this is true: surely there must be some differences to report. But Harlequin continues to insist that everything is the same. This scene corresponds to the well-known final scene of Arlequin empereur dans la lune, where
Harlequin presents himself to Dr. Balouard and his household as the Emperor of the Moon. Dr. Balouard happily grants the Emperor permission to marry his daughter. Since his advanced age will prevent him from accompanying Isabelle to her new home, however, the doctor takes advantage of the Emperor's presence to ask as many questions as he can about life on the moon. In response to each question the Emperor gives a description of lunar life that could pass just as well for a description, albeit satirical, of life on Earth. On the moon people are governed by self-interest and ambition, wives spend too much of their husbands' money, and the treatments that doctors give their patients are worse than the original illnesses. 13 In response to each of these descriptions, the various members of the household declare "c'est tout comme icy," "it's just like here."
In the original play, the other characters were excited to learn that the lunar world was just like their own. In Serres's retelling, however, the press remain incredulous.
Although Harlequin continues to insist that everything is exactly the same, the press observe that his own appearance belies that claim. "You who say that everywhere everything is just as it is here, can you also make us believe that your cape is the same in every part, for example in front as it is on the back?" 14 Now then, when everybody had his back turned, and the oil lamps were giving signs of flickering out, and it seemed that this evening the improvisation had ended up being a flop, someone suddenly called out, as if something new were playing in a place where everything had, that evening, been a repetition, so that the public as a whole, turned back as one, all looking toward the stage, violently illuminated by the dying fires of the floodlights:
"Pierrot! Pierrot! The audience cried, "Pierrot Lunaire!" 15 Pierrot is another of the stock characters of the commedia dell'arte tradition, recognizable most readily by his all white costume. His whiteness represents, at least in Serres's version of the story, pure indetermination, unconstrained possibility, the nothing that is also everything. 16 Harlequin's blank indeterminacy and possibility are not at all incompatible with his rigidly fixed position, his insistence that everywhere everything is the same. In fact these qualities are two sides of the same coin. As we have seen, exposition and preposition are the necessary conditions for position. On the one hand,
Harlequin is certainly exposed to radically different conditions of life on the moon and on the earth. Indeed as Serres points out, the emperor is more exposed than anyone else. He owes his success, and ultimately his very life, to a finely developed sensitivity for the people's various needs and grievances. 17 But on the other hand, Harlequin assimilates death unless I make a false deposition against an honorable person. 21 Although the situation is entirely unprecedented in my experience, its moral sense is given immediately and unambiguously: I must resist my fear of death and refuse to make the false deposition. The situation thus yields up its moral sense in a manner completely different from the way a foreign language yields up its sense. As regards obligation, there is only one language and we all speak it fluently.
But one might object here that our wills are not determined exclusively by the moral law and that we do therefore experience a dimension of moral possibility when we are called upon to act. Confronted with the sovereign's order to lie, for example, I
obviously retain the option of disregarding what the moral law commands, despite the clarity with which I conceive it. As Kant himself argues, the faculties of desire of finite rational beings like us are divided into higher and lower branches. The higher faculty of desire is reason itself insofar as it determines the will directly, through the mere form of law. 22 The lower faculty of desire, on the other hand, is determined pathologically, i.e.,
by the feelings of pleasure and pain; its principle is self-love or the pursuit of one's own happiness. 23 If our faculties of desire were not divided into these two branches, and if there were not therefore a very real possibility of choosing either in favor of the law or of our inclinations, then we could have no experience of obligation at all. For obligation, as Kant describes it, is an experience of constraint. If we had only a higher faculty of desire, so that we never experienced any incentives competing with the moral law, then we would never experience the law as constraining our action. We would act in accordance with the law as a matter of course. One might argue, then, that the concept of obligation, far from excluding any dimension of unactualized moral possibility, actually presupposes such a dimension.
But on Kant's terms, the possibility that is required by the concept of obligation is necessarily a non-moral possibility. An act that violates the moral law may very well be physically possible, but it is nonetheless morally impossible. 24 Kant attributes this insight to our moral common sense:
Suppose that an acquaintance whom you otherwise liked were to attempt to justify himself before you for having borne false witness by appealing to what he regarded as the holy duty of consulting his own happiness and, then, by recounting all the advantages he had gained thereby, pointing out the prudence he had shown in securing himself against detection, even by yourself, to whom alone he now reveals the secret only in order that he may be able at any time to deny it. And then suppose that he then affirmed, in all seriousness, that he had thereby fulfilled a true human duty-you would either laugh in his face or shrink from him in disgust. . . . 25 Anyone who is even minimally capable of moral experience can recognize "easily and without hesitation" that the pursuit of self-interest stands in need of justification by a higher principle; the principle of self-love can never be the source of obligation. The acquaintance's act of bearing false witness, then, is given immediately as morally impossible. If, on the other hand, the acquaintance had merely described how he was tempted to tell the lie, we would probably neither laugh in his face nor shrink from him in disgust, for the experience of inclination as an incentive to act contrary to duty is common to all finite rational beings. In experiencing the possibility of lying as a temptation, he would demonstrate his recognition of the moral law as ultimately authoritative. And recognizing the authoritativeness of the moral law, he could not experience the act of lying as a moral possibility.
That the moral law is the exclusive source of obligation is suggested perhaps even more strongly by the way in which we determine whether an act has a specifically moral worth. Beings like us, whose faculties of desire are divided into higher and lower branches, experience the moral law as constraining our wills, as commanding us to do our duty. This, again, is because we do not do our duty as a matter of course. But we do not experience the principle of self-love as constraining our action, for to act in accordance with that principle is to act just as we would if we had had no consciousness whatever of the moral law. Whatever is not given as commanded by the law is necessarily a non-moral possibility.
Finally, this position that we all take as practical agents subject to the authority of the moral law depends on no prior exposition. We do not pass through any disorienting middle on the way to our discovery of the moral law as the exclusive source of our obligations. Rather "the moral law is given, as an apodictically certain fact, as it were, of pure reason, a fact of which we are a priori conscious, even if it be granted that no example could be found in which it has been followed exactly." 27 The authoritativeness of the moral law "forces itself upon us as a synthetic proposition a priori based on no pure or empirical intuition." 28 We do not become conscious of the moral law, then, through any kind of medium, e.g., through our observations of others' conduct, through our consciousness of transcendental freedom, through moral feeling, or through theoretical cognition of a supposedly objective order of ends. The moral law, rather, "is firmly established of itself." 29 And from this firmly established position, which we have occupied always already, we are able to delimit the whole field of moral possibility without remainder.
Moral Possibilities
These characteristics of the phenomenon of obligation can all be traced back, Kant thinks, to "the naturally healthy understanding, which does not need to be taught but rather only to be enlightened." 30 For Kant, what is essential in the experience of obligation has its origin in the fact that our practical subjectivity is extended across a gap between the sensible and the intelligible, between inclination and the moral law. Obligation, as Kant conceives it, is only possible for a being whose "will is at a crossroads, as it were, between its principle a priori, which is formal, and its incentive a posteriori, which is material." 31 All of the examples that Kant uses to bring out what is essential in moral experience emphasize this conflict. That it is a duty to keep our promises is brought out by an example in which the practical subject is "pressured by distress" and thus tempted to act on the "principle of self-love, or of what is expedient for [herself] ." 32 That it is a duty to develop our talents is brought out by an example in which the subject "sees himself as in comfortable circumstances and sooner prefers to indulge in gratification than to trouble himself with the expansion and improvement of his fortunate natural predispositions." 33 What these examples and others like them show is that although our wills are situated at a crossroads, we know perfectly well which direction is the right one to take. Or to employ the more Serresian analogy, although our practical subjectivity is extended across the gap between the intelligible and the sensible, we find ourselves to have been firmly anchored on the side of the law always already. Despite our being tempted by the inclinations, we require "no well-informed shrewdness" to know what we ought to do. 34 At no point, then, are we really exposed to a morally disorienting middle.
But surely it is a great simplification of our moral experience to trace the experience of constraint back in every case to a conflict between inclination and the law.
In many cases, I want to argue, our experience of a situation as morally problematic can be traced back rather to our finding ourselves faced with a number of possibilities, all of which at least seem to make some kind of moral claim on us. In these situations, we find French soldiers were deprived of it. 35 In 1934, hoping to gain a better understanding of the sufferings of the working class, she took a leave of absence from her teaching position and began working in a factory. This work was especially hard for Weil, given her physical clumsiness and the extreme fragility of her health. And throughout her life,
Weil always refused to eat any more or any better food than the least fortunate were able to eat, a practice that played an important part in her death at the young age of thirty-four.
Even as her health rapidly deteriorated during a stay at a London hospital, Weil refused the nutrition that her doctors insisted was necessary for her recovery. The reason she gave for this refusal was that "she couldn't eat when she thought of the French people starving in France." 36 Now, from the moral position that I, and certainly many others, occupy, it seems clear that one ought not to sacrifice one's well-being and, a fortiori, one's life unless doing so will contribute to effecting some greater good. From this point of view, it is difficult to discern the moral sense of Weil's acts of self-sacrifice. Of course I can easily recognize the moral worth of Weil's strong concern for the well-being of others. But
given that her sharing of others' hardships put her at risk of dying at an unnecessarily young age, and more importantly, given that her doing so contributed practically nothing to the welfare of those for whom she professed concern, the moral worth of her acts is far from obvious. Her acts of self-sacrifice seem as morally pointless as banging one's head against a wall out of compassion for sufferers of migraine headaches. But this way of understanding the moral worth of Weil's actions seems to miss something essential. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant writes of respect that it "is a tribute we cannot refuse to pay to merit whether we will or not; . . would actually violate my obligation to her by trying to contribute to her happiness. The moral worth that she discerned in her own way of life would make a binding claim on me as well, at least as regards my conduct in relation to her. I would be obligated, in Kant's terms, to make her end my own, to support her in the way of life that caused her so much suffering. 40 I could not, of course, pursue both of these courses of action, even though both seem to make genuinely moral claims on me. Like the goalkeeper who is sensitive to multiple, incompatible possibilities, I would have to choose one of them without being able to know in advance whether my choice would turn out to have been the correct one.
Conclusion: Harlequin, Pierrot, and Moral Sensitivity
According to Kant, respect is the sensibly experienced effect of our having taken our moral stand always already for the law and against the inclinations. Our virtually occupying numerous, incompossible moral positions in no way weakens our obligation. It is rather the very basis of obligation. Our practical subjectivity is not indifferent to the multiplicity of moral possibilities across which it is stretched; like
Serres's goalkeeper, we must not only choose, but we must choose correctly. This "must"
is the constraint or necessitation that is essential to obligation. Having chosen, however,
we will tend to focus on the position we have taken, localizing obligation there and overlooking the exposition that is inseparable from it. The model for obligation, understood in this way, is provided by Harlequin Emperor of the Moon. On the one hand, for reasons that we have seen, no one is more exposed than Harlequin. Insofar as he is exposed in this way, Harlequin is Pierrot. He is truly a patchwork, at once a baker, an apothecary, a farmer, a chambermaid, and an ambassador. But insofar as he is Emperor,
Harlequin must be something more than just Pierrot: he must eventually take his stand and lay down the law, which will then appear to everyone within the empire, and indeed to Harlequin himself, as the very source of all obligation. Harlequin will slowly lose his sensitivity to possibilities other than the ones he has actualized, to the point where he will be able to declare with perfect certainty that, practically speaking, everywhere everything is exactly the same, that there is "nothing new under the sun or on the moon." 42 But, for reasons that Serres has described in great detail, Harlequin cannot maintain himself in this extreme state of insensitivity either. He must be something more than just the legislating subject. Harlequin Emperor of the Moon and Pierrot are ultimately indissociable. The phenomenon of obligation, then, has its locus neither in Harlequin
